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II.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2)(j).

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue No, 1 - Was the trial court's April 4, 2006 Order the result of a mistake as to
the Length of Time that had elapsed?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's April 4, 2006 order was sufficiently
founded in fact is judged by a clearly erroneous standard of review. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 9/ line 24 et seq.
Issue No. 2 - Did the Appellant's entry of a certificate of readiness render moot the
issue of failure to prosecute?
Standard of Review: Whether there is a justiciable controversy before a trial court
is governed by a correction of error standard. See Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1132.
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 10/ line 22 et seq; page 12/ line 10 et seq;
page 14/line 11 et seq.
Further, issues involving the separation of powers between branches of
government involve exceptional circumstances warranting judicial review on appeal. See
Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 847, 866 (1994). Advisory opinions or non-
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justiciable controversies offend the the separation of powers doctrine and so create
exceptional circumstances warranting appellate review. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT
12,1f26.
Issue No. 3 - Did The Court Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing For Want Of
Prosecution?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly dismissed a case for want of
prosecution of governed by an abuse of discretion standard. See Hartford Leasing
Corporation v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 9/ line 24 et seq.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Defendant/Appellee Jared Porter was formerly employed by the

Plaintiff/Appellant PDC as a graphic designer. Previous to his employment with PDC
Porter was employed by PDC's largest client. At the time he was employed by PDC 1999
it paid him double what he had been previously earning. That employment was governed
by an employment agreement which included a non-compete provision and made all of
Porter's design work produced for PDC a work for hire. In February of 2000 Porter
became romantically involved with one of the account managers for PDCs largest client.
Porter and that account manager arranged for him to surreptitiously perform graphic
design work for that client. Throughout this time Porter was secretly burning CDs
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containing PDC's proprietary graphic design work and graphic design tools. In January
of 2001 Porter abruptly terminated his employment with PDC and took the CDs with him.
PDC then reviewed the files on the computer Porter had used and discovered that he had
been doing work on his own account for PDCs largest client. PDC sued Porter and
obtained a pre-judgment writ of replevin. Porter's laptop computer was seized along with
39 CDs with handwritten labels indicating they contained proprietary work performed for
PDC's client. The parties entered into an April 15, 2001 agreement stipulating the terms
upon which PDC's claims against Porter would be settled. Under its terms the Defendant
was to account to Plaintiff for all money paid to him by Plaintiffs client and to make full
disclosure of all of his dealings with third parties regarding the Defendant's work for that
client. However, when deposed the Defendant refused to make that accounting and
repeatedly testified he could not recall particulars of his dealings with the client.
B. Course of the Proceedings
April 6, 2001

Appellant filed a complaint, a motion for a pre-judgment writ of
replevin, six supporting affidavits, an ex-parte motion for a TRO, a
memorandum in support of a motion for a TRO and a motion for
expedited discovery, and a motion for leave to file an over-length
memorandum.

April 6, 2001

The trial court issued a TRO, order authorizing expedited discovery,
an order granting leave to file an over-length memorandum, an order
authorizing a pre-judgment writ of replevin.

April 15, 2001

An agreement is signed specifying the terms that must be complied
with by the Defendant Porter for him to be released from Plaintiffs
claims in this action.

April 16, 2001

A hearing on the TRO is held, counsel appearing for both parties and
that hearing is continued to May 11, 2001.
3

May 7, 2001

A stipulation is filed with the court specifying the terms for the
copying of the hard drive on the Appellee's computer and for the redelivery of that computer to the Appellee.

May 7, 2001

An order approving that stipulation issues that same day.

May 11, 2001

The TRO hearing is continued to June 18, 2001 at counsel's request.

June 18, 2001

Counsel for Porter fails to appear at the TRO hearing. Counsel for
the Appellant addresses the court as to a possible settlement and
requests and evidentiary hearing.

August 14, 2001

The evidentiary hearing scheduled for this date proceeds after the
advice to the court by counsel for the Appellee that the case has
settled. Appellant's CEO is examined by counsel for the Appellee.

April 9, 2003

Appellee moves to enforce the agreement on settlement terms.

May 10, 2003

Appellant moves to set aside the settlement.

November 26, 2003 The court denied the Appellee's motion to Enforce the Agreement on
settlement terms and Motion for Costs. It also denied the Appellant's
motion to set aside the agreement on settlement terms.
October 27, 2004

The court issues an OSC re: dismissal returnable before the court
November 30, 2004.

November 30, 2004 Counsel for the parties appear and the court orders discovery to be
completed within 90 days.
March 1, 2005

A stipulation by the parties to extend the time for discovery is filed.

April 4, 2006

The court orders that a Certificate of Readiness for Trial be filed
with the court by April 30, 2006 or the case will be dismissed
without further notice.

April 28, 2006

Appellant fax-files a certificate of readiness to the trial court.

May 8, 2006

Appellee/Defendant objects to the certificate of readiness arguing
that it has not had sufficient opportunity to complete discovery.

August 09, 2006

Appellant's motion to strike and amended motion to strike the
4

Appellee Porter's Objection is fax-filed with the trial court.
August 10, 2006

Appellant/Plaintiffs motion to strike the Appellee/Defendant's
Objection is filed.

August 10, 2006

The court rules that the case should be dismissed with prejudice.

August 31, 2006

Appellant objects to the proposed form of order dismissing the case
with prejudice.

September 5, 2006 Order dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution.
October 5, 2006

Notice of Appeal filed.

C. Disposition at the Trial Court
After a certificate of readiness for trial is entered, the Appellee Porter moved to
dismiss the case with prejudice and that motion is granted.
V.

RELEVANT FACTS
A. Facts about the Case
In June of 2001 Jared Porter was deposed by PDC and a disagreement arose

between the parties whether Porter was performing as promised under the terms of the
April 15, 2001 agreement to settle the Plaintiffs claims against Porter. On April 9, 2003
Porter moved to enforce the agreement on settlement terms. R. 0310. PDC responded by
moving to set aside the agreement on settlement terms. R. 0373. This litigation
culminated in an order of Judge Lynn Davis dated November 26, 2003 in which he
refused to enforce the agreement on settlement terms. Instead, the parties were directed
to pursue discovery. R. 0619. After Judge Davis's order, Judge Derek Pullan assumed
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conduct of the case.
Pursuant to an order of Judge Pullan dated November 30, 2004, discovery in this
case was to have been conducted during 2005. Despite stipulations by the parties to
extend the time for discovery, neither party commenced discovery. On March 14, 2006
Judge Pullan issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable before the court in American
Fork on April 4, 2006 at 9 a.m., requiring the parties to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed. R.0637. At that hearing the court took into account the eighteen
months delay in prosecuting the case (actually only sixteen months). R. 0733; page 5/ line
7. The court then ordered that certificate of readiness or scheduling order be filed with
the court by April 30, 2006. On April 28, 2006 a certificate of readiness was fax-filed by
PDC's counsel. R. 0641.
On May 8, 2006 Porter objected to the entry of the Certificate of Readiness and
moved to dismiss the case, alleging that Porter had not yet filed an answer, that there had
been no opportunity for discovery, that PDC had failed to challenge the settlement within
the time limited, that the issue of settlement was yet to be litigated and that PDC's only
remedies would sound in contract. R. 0682. In substance, Porter's motion alleged that the
trial court had mistakenly believed that only a short time had elapsed since the last
hearing before the court, when in fact there had been no steps taken in the case from
November 30, 2004 to April 4, 2006, and that the court had on the basis of that mistaken
belief directed the entry of the certificate of readiness. Porter's motion also claimed that
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms was a predicate to any trial on the
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merits and that because the November 3, 2003 order had denied the PDCs motion to set
aside the settlement, the entry of the certificate of readiness was in error. In fact, the court
decided in its November 26, 2003 order denied both parties motions for summary
judgment on the issue of enforceability of the April 15, 2001 agreement on settlement
terms, ruling that material issues of disputed fact remained. R. 0623. The trial court
specifically relied upon Porter's factual misstatements in reversing its prior order and
dismissing the case with prejudice. R.732: page 23/ line 19 et seq. However, no order
striking the certificate of readiness has ever been entered.

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law settlement agreements are executory and until the terms of a

settlement agreement are fulfilled there is no settlement. PDC's settlement agreement
with Porter specifically contemplated Porter being deposed under oath and fully
disclosing all details regarding his involvement with third parties in his wrongful
appropriation of PDC's business interests and proprietary information. Porter was
deposed under oath and as a result of that deposition PDC maintained that it was apparent
Porter was refusing to make the disclosure promised. Subsequently, Porter moved to
enforce a settlement agreement and PDC responded by moving to set the settlement
agreement aside. Judge Davis ruled that there were material disputed issues of fact that
prevented summary judgment on the issue of whether the settlement agreement was
enforceable and directed the parties to litigate that issue.
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Judge Davis's order by its terms placed just as great an onus on Porter as PDC to
litigate that issue. Although PDC had already conducted extensive discovery on that
issue, subsequent to November 30, 2004 neither party took any steps to litigate that issue
and when on April 4, 2006 an OSC hearing was held before Judge Pullan he specifically
noted that eighteen months had elapsed since the November 30, 2004 order, thus
establishing that there was no confusion in his mind about the length of time that elapsed
without activity by either party.
Judge Pullan ordered that a certificate of readiness or a scheduling order be filed
by April 30, 2006, and PDC complied by filing a certificate of readiness on April 28,
2006. That certificate of readiness was properly filed because PDC had performed all the
discovery necessary to prosecute its case against Porter and Porter had for almost two and
one half years done nothing to advance his case, because Judge Davis had previously
ruled that whether the case had been settled could not be resolved without a trial and
because since November 26, 2003 Porter had known he needed to file an answer but had
failed to do so. Further, PDC's filing of the certificate of readiness rendered the issue of
failure to prosecute moot, especially when Porter's failure to move for the entry of a
scheduling order is considered.
Instead, Porter waited to see whether PDC would file a certificate of readiness.
When it did Porter objected. That objection sought re-litigate the issue of failure to
prosecute by falsely alleging that PDC was solely responsible for the eleven month delay
that had accrued. Porter also moved to collaterally attack Judge Davis's November 26,
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2003 order by asking Judge Pullan, in effect, to rule that because the enforceability of the
settlement agreement had not been further litigated, and because Porter had not taken the
opportunity to conduct discovery on the enforceability of the settlement agreement, Judge
Pullan should rule that PDC had failed to prosecute its claim that the settlement
agreement was not enforceable and so its entire case against Porter must be dismissed.
In addition to the lapse of time there are five factors that must be employed by a
trial court in exercising its discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. These are:
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the
case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the
difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) most
important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Plainly, when a certificate of
readiness had already been filed, when there was no reasonable basis for re-litigating the
trial court's April 4, 2006 order and when Porter had clearly been much more negligent
than PDC in prosecuting the action, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
accept Porter's repeated misstatement of the facts controlling the procedural posture of
the case and dismiss PDC's claims by relying on Porter' misstatements.

VII.

ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF A CERTIFICATE
OF READINESS WAS PROPERLY MADE
In making its order for the entry of a certificate of readiness (or entry of a

scheduling order) the trial court was well aware that a lengthy period of time had elapsed
9

since its order of November 30, 2004. The court refers to this lapse of time as eighteen
months (when actually it was sixteen months).1 The court then noted that the 90 day
period provided for discovery had elapsed. And, contrary to Porter's representations to
the court on August 10, 2006,2 the court specifically noted that the parties had stipulated
to an extension of discovery to April 30, 2005 by stating "And then there's an extension,
there's an agreement for an extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005."3 The court
then advised that a notice of readiness be filed "after that" on April 30, 2006. If, as
counsel for Porter maintained, the court was under the misapprehension that the
stipulation for discovery ran through April 30, 2006, the court would have selected a date
after April 30, 2006 for the filing of a notice of readiness for trial. But it selected April
30, 2006, which confirmed that it was aware that the stipulation had already expired.
Even if the trial court was momentarily confused as to whether the stipulation was
still in place, that was neither here nor there because the trial court in any event set April
30, 2006 as the date for the entry of a certificate of readiness, which was only 24 days
subsequent to the hearing date. It is apparent then that any momentary confusion as to the
operation of the stipulation for discovery did not result in the extension of the time for
discovery nor did it result in the trial court extending the time for the next step in the
action. Instead, the trial court required the entry of a certificate of readiness by the end of
^.733: page 5/line 7.
2

R.732: page 7, line 18. At the August 10, 2006 hearing Porter's counsel erroneously
stated [I]n your hearing with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your understanding was
that my stipulation ran through April 30, 2006."
u

3

R.733: page 6/line 3.
10

April 2006, which was only a few weeks after the April 4, 2006 hearing.
The record of the April 4, 2006 hearing unequivocally shows that the trial court
was aware of the amount of time that had transpired between November 30, 2004 and
April 30, 2006. In fact, the court overestimated that time. The court also specifically
identified April 30, 2005 as the date the stipulated extension of discovery expired.
Accordingly, the court's order of April 4, 2006 requiring the entry of a certificate of
readiness by the end of the month was not (as erroneously claimed by Porter at the August
10, 2006 reconvened hearing) 4 , entered by mistake. In making that order the trial court
specifically took into account the lapse of time from November 30, 2004 to April 4, 2006
and clearly identified April 30, 2005 as the date when discovery terminated.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LAW IN REVERSING ITS APRIL 4, 2006
RULING AT THE RECONVENED AUGUST 10, 2006 OSC HEARING.
When on August 10, 2006 the trial court reconvened the April 4, 2006 OSC
hearing, 5 Porter's objection to the filing of a certificate of readiness was argued. Porter
erroneously alleged that the certificate of readiness misstated the facts and so had been
improperly filed.6 Analysis of each of the matters certified by PDC shows they were
properly certified.

4

At the August 10, 2006 hearing Porter's counsel erroneously stated "[I]n your hearing
with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your understanding was that my stipulation ran
through April 30, 2006." p. 7, line 18.
5

R.732: p. 20/ line 21 et seq.

6

R.732: page 8/ line 4 et seq.
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1. All necessary pleadings had been filed. Once Judge Davis had made his order
of November 26, 2003 a responsive pleading was in order from Porter. Porter cannot
now complain because he did not file a responsive pleading nor should he be allowed to
obstruct the entry of a certificate of readiness because of his failure to file a responsive
pleading. In that case, it was appropriate for plaintiff to certify that all necessary
pleadings had been filed. There is no rule of law that states that a defendant must file a
responsive pleading before a case can go to trial on the merits. Absent from Porter's
caviling that he has never filed an answer is any showing of prejudice to Porter because of
this defect. Because Porter defaulted in making any showing of prejudice due to his
failure to file an answer, he could make no objection to the certificate of readiness on this
basis.
2. Counsel had completed all discovery. This too was an appropriate certification
by PDC.'s counsel. The amount of discovery to be conducted in any civil case is in the
discretion of the parties. If the parties choose to forego discovery that is in their
discretion. As was admitted by Porter at the August 10, 2006 hearing, PDC had already
deposed Porter for 14 hours. It was Porter that had decided not to conduct any discovery
whatsoever. Further, as Porter also admitted at the August 10, 2006 hearing, and in fact
vigorously asserted, that discovery cutoff of April 30, 2005 had long since passed.
Accordingly, all discovery had been completed and it was appropriate to certify the case
ready for trial.
Again, Porter failed to show any prejudice because of this certification. Porter had
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known since November 26, 2003 that the court had denied his motion for summary
judgment on his claim that the agreement on settlement terms had been fully satisfied by
him. As of that date he was on notice that if he wished conduct discovery on that issue
(or on the merits of the case), he must proceed. But in the almost two and one half years
until April 4, 2006 Porter chose to conduct no discovery. A party's own refusal to act
cannot be the cause of prejudice to that party. Porter's objection to the certificate of
readiness on this basis was unfounded.
3. Settlement discussions have been pursued by counsel but no settlement has
been effected. Under Utah law settlement agreements are executory.7 And in this case
the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis had specifically found that material issues
of fact remained on the issue of whether the case had been settled and that a lengthy
evidentiary hearing would have to be held to resolve that issue. By force of definition, if
both parties have moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether settlement had
been effected and the court had ruled that because material issues of fact remained it
could not grant either party's motion, a trial is necessary to resolve that issue. Until that
trial resolves those disputed issues no settlement has been effected. This was an
appropriate certification. Further, Judge Pullan in his April 4, 2006 order did not limit the
scope of the certificate of readiness to a trial on the issue of settlement but refer generally
to a certificate of readiness, thus indicating that he wanted the case set down for trial on

7

See Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1082 (Utah 1985).
Only upon completion of the substituted performance agreed to by the parties to the agreement
will the settlement agreement extinguish the underlying claim. See Bradshaw v. Burningham,
671 P.2d 196,198 (Utah 1983).
13

all issues that remain to be determined.
Because of Porter's repeated, erroneous assertions on August 10, 2006 that at the
April 4, 2006 hearing the court had misapprehended the length of the delay in the case,
the trial court mistakenly reversed its order directing that a certificate of readiness be
entered because Porter failed to appear at the April 4, 2006 OSC hearing. This was done
despite PDC's counsel's advice that his recall was that the court had been aware of the
length of the delay.8 This reversal by the trial court was improper because it was based on
Porter's erroneous allegations on what had occurred at that April 4, 2006 hearing. It was
also improper for a number of other reasons.
First, Porter with his objection filed a belated motion to dismiss. Note that the trial
court on March 14, 2006 had issued its OSC. Yet Porter filed nothing in advance of that
motion. In particular, he did not file a motion to dismiss, although all the grounds
asserted (erroneous though they may be) that were asserted in his May 8, 2006 motion to
dismiss (also styled as an objection) could have been brought by a motion to dismiss filed
prior to April 4, 2006. But it was only after he was confronted with a certificate of
readiness for trial that Porter filed his motion to dismiss.
More importantly, Porter's motion to dismiss was filed after PDC had filed the
certificate of readiness. Porter could have immediately filed his objection/ motion to
dismiss the court's April 4, 2006 order directing the entry of a certificate of readiness (or
a scheduling order), but waited until after PDC had taken the next step in prosecuting its

8

R.732: page 10/ line 2.
14

case and had filed a certificate of readiness. By then PDC had performed the very act
required by the trial court to timely move the case toward trial (i.e. file a certificate of
readiness) and this made the issue of failure to prosecute moot. A moot claim has lost its
ability to provide judicial relief to the litigants.9 By taking the next step to prosecute the
case (a step which was specifically directed by the trial court), PDC moved the case
forward which meant that there was no longer a failure to prosecute by PDC and that
issue had been rendered moot.
This meant that when the OSC hearing was reconvened on August 10, 2006 there
was no longer a failure to prosecute by PDC and that there was no justiciable controversy
regarding Porter's untimely motion to dismiss.10 Because there was no longer a
justiciable controversy on the issue of failure to prosecute, all that was left for
consideration by the trial court was Porter's objection to the entry of the certificate of
readiness. The issue of mootness may be raised sua sponte by a trial court.11 In that
regard, it seems the question of mootness falls into the same category as a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.12 Both of these procedural defects militate against a court's further
considering a matter, because to do so would result in the rendering of an advisory
9

Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1116, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah

2002).
10

Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1132.

n

Id. at 1136.

n

See Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisU 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) where the court
stated: "At the outset, we note that acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction and that a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the
court."
15

opinion.13 Accordingly, when during the August 10, 2006 hearing the trial court
considered the question of P D C s failure to prosecute the action before it, it did so
improperly because that issue had already been rendered moot.14

C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S
CLAIMS
Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State15 provides the rule to be applied in this case
in determining whether the Plaintiffs case was subject to dismissal for failure to
prosecute. There this Court reviewed and then applied the five factors controlling the
exercise of a trial court's discretion in determining whether it should dismiss an action.
The five factors identified were: (1) "the conduct of both parties"; (2) the opportunity
available to each party to move the case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in
moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party
by reason of the delay; and (5) "most important, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal."16
In applying these factors to this case it must be remembered that the only delay at
issue before the trial court on August 10, 2006 was the eleven months of delay accruing
since the expiration of the April 30, 2005 discovery cut-off. The previous delay in

13

Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21,116.

14

R.732: p. 12/ linelO - 25; p. 13/ line 9; line 11 -18.

15

888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

16

Id. at 697.
16

prosecution of the case, which had accrued up until the trial court's order of November
30, 2004 was not considered by the trial court at the Order to Show Cause hearing on
April 4, 2006. The only delay considered by the trial court at that April 4, 2006 hearing
were the eighteen months (actually sixteen months) that the trial court stated had accrued
from November 30, 2004 until April 4, 2006.17 As to that sixteen months, five of those
months that had accrued had been designated for discovery and only eleven of those
months were months that had not been scheduled by the trial court. It was this eleven
months of delay in prosecuting the case that formed the basis upon which the Defendant
objected to the filing of a certificate of readiness.18
Proper consideration of that delay requires that the procedural posture of this case
be understood. The April 15, 2001 agreement signed by the parties specified the terms
with which Porter must comply before Plaintiffs claims against Porter would be
dismissed. This included the copying of Porter's hard drive and his making full

17

R.733: page 5/ line 7 et seq.

18

SeeDef.Mem.Obj.:
p. 2 "when, in fact, that stipulation ended over a year ago on April 30, 2005.";
p. 3 "Plaintiff did nothing over the next year to challenge the settlement agreement and
the court issued an Order to Show Cause . . .";
p. 4 "during this 60 day period which ended on April 30, 2005 . . .";
p. 4 "when in fact the stipulation only ran through April 30, 2005.";
p. 4 ". . . stipulated time period for Plaintiff to challenge the settlement had passed a year
before.";
p. 5 "Plaintiff did nothing on the case for another year until an order to show cause was
issued by the court.";
p. 6 "A year has passed since the last stipulated deadline for Plaintiff to challenge the
settlement..."
Unfortunately, this memorandum does not appear to be included in the appellate record.
The motion which this memorandum supports is at R.682.
17

disclosure to the Plaintiff under oath in a deposition of all facts regarding his
appropriation of P D C s client, its proprietary information and the persons involved with
him in that misappropriation. On June 14 and 29 of 2001 Porter was deposed on those
matters. Almost immediately the parties were in disagreement about Porter's conduct
during the deposition. Plaintiff believes it is obvious from the deposition transcripts that
Porter was being non-cooperative and obstructive. He is clearly a hostile witness.
For example, under the terms of the agreement on settlement terms Porter is not
released from liability until a permanent injunction is obtained prohibiting him from
making any further use of P D C s data or soliciting further work from any of P D C s
clients. However, performance of this provisions was rendered moot by Porter's own
malfeasance. 19 Moreover, under the terms of the agreement on settlement terms Porter
was to forthwith irrevocably assign over to PDC all amounts invoiced to date to
Pharmanex (see h in the settlement agreement). Yet in his deposition Porter at first

19

R.734:
page 177/line 22 MR. ADY: Porter, have you accessed the Celllnteractive.com Website
since April 15th of this year?
page 177/line 15 Porter: / believe I accessed it when you provided me the password to do
so, yes.
page 178/line 15 MR. ADY: // 's the case where you can add content but can Y remove it?
page 178/line 17 Porter: Without removing the whole thing. Unfortunately, in the current
job search, I need some representation in my portfolio.
Here is Porter's admission that he has refused to take down his Website. There was no
attempt by him to take it down, and apparently no consideration given to taking down the
Website, removing the PDC content and then re-erecting the site for the limited purpose of
exhibiting Porter's portfolio. In any event, Porter's claim that with the key provided he could
add but not remove material from his Website was later admitted to be without merit.
18

claimed his work for Pharmanex was performed for free,20 but Porter also equivocates
about why he was not paid by Pharmanex. 21 He stammers that payment was not
forthcoming because there was a conflict between PDC and Pharmanex and then claims
that he had no contract for work with Pharmanex. He admits he spoke with the COO of
Pharmanex, about being paid $6,000.00 per month for his work,22 then denies any such
conversation. 23 When confronted with emails corroborating the conversation with the
COO, Porter becomes frustrated.24 Porter was also confronted with additional emails
corroborating the payment arrangements.25
Despite Porter's contractual commitment to come clean and assist PDC in
prosecuting third parties, he denies that his romantic interest (the account manager with

20

R.735: page 43/ line 2; page 45/ line 13; page 106/ line 24; page 107/ line 1 (not for
hire); page 108/ line 15 (a mock invoice).
21

R.734: page 97/ line 13.

22
23

R.735: page 143/ line 13.

R.734: page 93/ line 17.

24

R.734: page 202/ line 13 , finds Porter becoming frustrated when referred to an E-mail
where he advises a friend, "I could go back to Pharmanex for $6,000 a month." See also page
203/ line 10 where Porter voices frustration.
25

R.734: page 205 line 15 he is referred to Exhibit 15 and his advice to a friend that he has
yet to bill Pharmanex for a $10K month. On February 23, 2002 Porter advises his mother (see
Exhibit 16) that he has billables and just, "[has] to wait a week to get paid." At page 208/ line
16 he admits that he was to be paid for this work. Porter in the same E-mail refers to at
$12,000.00 coming to him for his last seven projects and that he is just waiting for the check.
Yet when asked about this in his deposition at page 209/ line 11 Porter claims he had not yet
billed Pharmanex for this work. But then at page 211/ line 18 and page 212 /line 11 reference is
made to exhibits in which Porter refers to loopholes he hopes to use to get around PDC.
19

Pharmanex) was Irying to destroy P D C s relationship with Pharmanex. 26 When again
referred to Exhibit 16 and his statement in that email that, "I hope that PDC is forever
blacklisted from working with Nuskin. As long as (blank) is there, she'll see to that'\ he
asserts that Ms. (blank) was ^justified in that cause since I was completing most of the
work for her."27 These are just a few of the examples of Porter's contumacious refusal to
perform or execute the terms of his settlement agreement with PDC. In response, Porter
claims, in substance, that he has been fully cooperative.
On April 9, 2003 Porter moved to have the agreement on settlement terms deemed
completed by Porter. On May 10, 2003 PDC filed a cross-motion to have the agreement
settlement terms declared void because of Porter's refusal to perform his obligations
under it. On November 26, 2003 Judge Lynn Davis, who prior to Judge Pullan had
conduct of the case, denied both motions by ruling:
"Because this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist, neither
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Counsel for plaintiff is
instructed to prepare an order denying its motion. Counsel for defendant is
instructed to prepare an order denying his motion consistent with this
opinion. It is this Court's opinion that a lengthy evidentiary hearing is
probably implicated, that experts would need to be employed, and that each
party might need to seek new legal counsel. In light of this opinion, the
Court invites the parties to seriously reconsider the proposed resolution of
the case." R. 0623.
Porter in his May 8, 2006 objection to the filing of a certificate of readiness falsely
claims that the trial court denied only P D C s motion to set aside the agreement on

TR.734: page 150/line 23.
at page 207, line 3
20

settlement terms. Obviously, under the terms of the November 26, 2003 order both
parties were equally charged with prosecuting their respective claims regarding the April
15, 2001 agreement on settlement terms. It is in this context that the five factors identified
in Hartford Leasing must be applied.
Neither party moved the case forward in the sixteen months from November 30,
2004 to April 4, 2006. But PDC had already prior to that time moved the case toward a
conclusion. PDC has already deposed Porter for two days and has those transcripts. It has
already copied his hard drive and has all the documents contained on his hard drive. It
has already filed a number of affidavits in this case specifying the testimony to be
proffered by the witnesses for PDC in this case. Porter in his deposition has made it clear
that he is stonewalling and will not be forthcoming with further information. This
apparently was done to protect the account manager at PDCs former client, with whom
Porter was romantically involved. As a result of PDC s discovery it has solid evidence
that Porter not only misappropriated PDC's client and its proprietary information, but
then entered into an agreement on settlement terms which would have allowed Porter to
escape all liability to PDC if Porter just made full disclosure. This deposition transcripts
clearly show that he refused to do so.
The above facts show that PDC has taken a number of steps to move this case
forward and in fact has practically moved discovery forward as far as is practicable when
Porter's stonewalling is taken into consideration, and with its discovery efforts has
brought the issue of Porter's liability on the merits to a conclusive determination and with

21

those discovery efforts has also brought Porter's liability for breach of his obligations
under the agreement on settlement terms into clear focus. Thus, it is evident that under
the first three factors stated in Hartford Leasing PDC has engaged in substantial conduct
to move the case forward, but has had no greater opportunity than Porter to move the case
forward and yet PDC has obtained substantial results in moving the case forward.
When applied to Porter, the picture is much more bleak. Although Porter has had
an equal opportunity to move the case forward, he has done nothing. Instead, Porter
although immediately aware of the outcome of the April 4, 2006 Order to Show Cause
hearing28 did nothing until PDC filed a certificate of readiness for trial, and then in
response to that certificate of readiness for trial erroneously objected to it by, in
substance, complaining that Porter had failed to file an answer, had failed to seek the
entry of a scheduling order and had failed to conduct any discovery on PDC's claims. In
his objection Porter laid all of this at the feet of PDC by mis-characterizing to the trial
court that it was PDC's sole obligation to inquire into the enforceability of the agreement
on settlement terms and by mis-characterizing that PDC was solely responsible for the
delay from April 30, 2005 to April 4, 2006.
Recited below are some examples of that self-serving mis-characterization:
"Also, contrary to Plantiff s assertions, because of the settlement, there has been

28

His counsel called prior to the 9:00 a.m. hearing to state he had mistakenly gone to the
Provo courthouse and was on his way. It a half hour drive from American Fork to Provo, and the
court recessed the hearing for 45 minutes so that Porter's counsel could attend. He arrived just
after the hearing had been concluded.
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no discovery whatsoever on the merits of Plaintiff s claims."29
Plaintiff . . . moved to set aside the settlement agreement. That motion was
denied.30
[T]he court stated that Plaintiffs affidavits raised issues of fact and, therefore,
gave Plaintiff time-limited opportunity for discovery on whether settlement had been
fulfilled and a time limited opportunity limited opportunity to file a dispositive motion on
the issue."31
In fact, there are a number of other places in his memorandum in support of
objection to the trial court where Porter repeatedly mis-characterizes this case as one
where the Plaintiff was solely responsible for the delay that had accrued, and that the case
had already been settled but that PDC nevertheless had the sole obligation to inquire into
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms.
The glaring defect in the trial court's dismissing PDC's case against Porter is that
it accepted these false claims by Porter when it ruled:
"In reply the defendant contends that it has never been the defendant's
burden of proof to challenge the settlement agreement, that a written
agreement settlement agreement was entered into by the parties, it's always
been the defendant's view view that the settlement agreement was in place,
and that it would be the party seeking to set the settlement agreement aside
that would have the burden of proof and the burden of moving the case
forward. Having considered those arguments I find the, that the defendant's
arguments have merit. The motion to dismiss is granted." R.732: page 23/
29

Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. Unfortunately, it appears that the clerk did not paginate as part of
the record Porter's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. The motion is at R.682. In
any event, this statement is false. As the above transcript excerpts show, PDC has done extensive
discovery on the merits of its claims.
30

Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. What Porter's counsel fails to mention is that the November 26,
2003 order denies Porter's motion as well. See R.732: page 14/ line 7.
31

Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. Again, Porter's counsel omits the fact that the court imposed this
obligation on both parties jointly. See R.623.
23

line 19 et seq.
As the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis clearly shows, both parties were
equally charged with resolving the issue of whether the agreement on settlement terms
was enforceable and in relying on Porter's mis-characterization of the status of the
settlement agreement as a basis to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint, Judge Pullan relied
on representations that were clearly wrong. Not only did Judge Pullan err, by accepting
Porter's characterization of the status of the agreement on settlement as being something
that "was in place" the court's actions could be construed as overruling Judge Davis. But
one district judge cannot overrule another acting district judge having identical authority
and stature.32
As explained above, PDC's entry of a certificate of readiness in response to the
trial court's April 4, 2006 order rendered the question of failure to prosecute moot. Once
the question of failure to prosecute had became moot there could be no need to reconsider
the November 26, 2003 ruling of Judge Davis, even if Judge Pullan could have properly
done so. But PDC's motion to strike the Objection of Porter shows that Judge Pullan did
not have discretion to overrule a coordinate judge on an order that had become law of the
case.33 So on at least two grounds, the law of the case doctrine and mootness, Judge
Pullan did not have discretion to revisit the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis.

32

State v. Morgan. 527 P.2d 225 (Utah 1974). See also Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938
(Utah 1987) where the court held that one district court judge cannot overrule another district
court judge of equal authority even if prior judge relinquished all authority and jurisdiction in
matter for reasons of judicial economy.
33

R.695.
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Further, once it is recognized that both parties had an equal obligation to litigate
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms then the fourth factor in Hartford
Leasing,34 which is the prejudice imposed upon Porter by reason of the delay, is readily
resolved. Porter was throughout this time well aware of the terms of the November 26,
2003 order which required him to conduct discovery on his claim that he had fully
performed his obligations under the settlement agreement. He knew that he had
conducted no discovery whatsoever in this case and that the only discovery had been
conducted by PDC. In that light, the only prejudice that accrued to Porter as a result of
the delay is prejudice which Porter imposed upon himself. Because he chose to forego
discovery, Porter cannot be heard to make the ludicrous complaint that because of PDC s
delay Mr Porter has not conducted discovery. It was because of Porter's delay that Porter
did not conduct any discovery.
Moreover, Porter failed to make any showing to the trial court that anything had
happened in those eleven months to impair his ability to prosecute his claim that he had
fully performed his obligations under the agreement on settlement terms. There was no
showing of the disappearance of witnesses, of documents or of any other evidence.
The final factor to be considered is whether injustice will result from the dismissal.
As the court in Hartford Leasing stated "'Dismissal with prejudice . . . is a harsh and
permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their

888 P.2d at 698.
25

merits." v Dismissal of P D C s claims because Porter has failed to conduct any discovery
on his claim that he had fully performed his obligations under the agreement on
settlement terms, is manifestly unjust because it punishes the Appellant/ PDC for Porter's
default. For almost two and one half years prior to the April 4, 2006 show cause hearing,
Porter knew of the November 26, 2003 order that specifically denied his motion to
enforce the agreement on settlement terms, yet he did nothing. When at the April 4, 2006
OSC hearing the trial court properly directed that a certificate of readiness be entered or a
scheduling order be entered, he did not seek the entry of a scheduling order entered, but
instead waited to see if a Certificate of Readiness was filed. Then he objected to the
filing of that Certificate of Readiness because, among other defaults by Porter, no
scheduling order had been entered.
A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the
decision." 36 Under Hartford Leasing and a continuing line of cases back to Westinghouse
Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.37 the five factors applied in
Hartford Leasing are the criteria to be applied in determining whether there was a
reasonable basis for dismissing an action with prejudice. Those factors largely consist of
a comparison of the conduct of the respective parties to the action. The analysis above
shows that when each of those five criteria are applied to the procedural facts of this case,

35

Hartford at 700, quoting Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson
Michie Assocs.. toe, 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986).
36

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).

37

544 P.2d 876 (Utahl975).
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Porter's case for dismissal is no more than a complaint that he has been dilatory.
Although both parties conducted extensive motion practice on the issue of whether
the agreement on settlement terms was enforceable, only PDC has conducted discovery
which bears on that issue. And only PDC has conducted discovery which bears on the
issue of the merits of this case. Porter has had equal opportunity and was given notice by
the November 26, 2203 order, just as PDC was, that the enforceability of the settlement
agreement was an issue to be resolved. It would be a harsh and entirely unjust outcome to
dismiss PDC's claims because Porter does not want to go to trial on a record he for at
least two and one half years knew would be the record unless he conducted further
discovery. The trial court's reliance on Porter's mis-characterization as to the meaning
and effect of the November 26, 2003 order and basis of the trial court's April 4, 2006
order was clearly without foundation in fact. Accordingly, the trial court abused its
discretion in dismissing PDC's claims and that order of dismissal should be reversed.

VIII.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
In making its April 4, 2006 order the trial court properly took into account the

length of delay in prosecuting this case. A certificate of readiness was entered on the
strength of that order. This rendered the issue failure to prosecute moot. There was no
basis for reconvening the OSC hearing on August 10, 2006 and because there was no
justiciable controversy before the trial court on that date, Porter's motion to dismiss was
also moot. The April 15, 2001 agreement on settlement terms provide for the payment of
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reasonable attorney fees and costs by the party breaching that agreement. PDC requests a
ruling by this Court that the trial court erred in dismissing the Appellant's case with
prejudice or, alternatively, abused its discretion. PDC further requests a ruling from this
Court that it is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and cost for this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October, 2007.

RONXLD ADY/
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc.
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ADDENDUM:
A. Transcript of April 4, 2006 hearing
B. Transcript of August 10, 2006 ruling dismissing the case with prejudice.
C. Order dismissing the case with prejudice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of The
Appellant PDC Consulting, Inc." was mailed by the United States Postal Service on the
10th day of October, 2007 to the following:
Matthew Raty
9677 S 700 E STE D
Sandy, Utah 84070

Ronald Ady
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(April 4, 2006)

3
4

THE JUDGE:
Porter.

5
6

MR. ADY:

Ronald Ady here for PDC Consulting,

Your Honor.

7
8

PDC Consulting, Inc. versus Jared

THE JUDGE:

Good morning.

the clerk's office?

9

Is a, who contacted

And you went to Provo this morning?

MR. ADY:

No, I didn't.

10

THE JUDGE:

Oh.

11

THE CLERK:

Oh, I'm sorry.

It was Matthew Raty.

12

THE JUDGE:

Matthew Raty.

Okay.

13

counsel for the defendant I guess?

14

conversation with Mr.

15

MR. ADY:

16

THE JUDGE:

And is he

Have you had any

—

No.
—

Raty?

He contacted the court

17

this morning and said he had inadvertently gone to Provo

18

rather than to here so he is enroute.

19

call, do you know?

What time did he

20

THE CLERK:

(Short inaudible, no mic),.

21

THE JUDGE:

He should be here any minute.

22

THE CLERK:

He should be here soon.

23

THE JUDGE:

I'll give him, let's give him until

24

quarter to.

25

time.

If he fails to appear we'll deal with it at that

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 3

Court will be in recess for a few moments.

1

(Recess).

2
THE JUDGE:

Do we have any sign of Mr. Raty this

5

MR. ADY:

No.

6

THE JUDGE:

I'll call the matter of PDC

3
4

morning?

7

Consulting, Inc. versus Jared Porter.

8

reflect that counsel for Mr. Porter contacted the clerk a

9

little after 9:00 this morning indicating that he had gone to

10

the wrong courthouse, he had gone to Provo.

1 1 to 10:00.
12

The record should

It's now five

There was ample time to appear and a, we've not

seen him.

13

Mr. Ady, what is the status of this case?

14

MR. ADY:

The status, Your Honor, last time we

15

were here we were going to do some discovery and that never,

16

I don't know what happened.

17

in the file frankly.

18

morning.

19

the same time and I, each of them my draft some far is 50

20

pages each which is the maximum.

21

looked at the file.

22

discovery issues.

I haven't had a chance to look

I had it on my calendar and came this

I'm currently involved in briefing two appeals at

So frankly, I haven't

But as I recall it there were still

23

And particularly from our side, the plaintiff's

24

side we had brought a motion to set aside the settlement.

25

Our view was that Mr. Porter hadn't complied with the

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

settlement agreement, that was executory and he hadn't

2

complied with substantial terms.

3

argument on that and I know we had talked about discovery the

4

last time around.

5

has occurred.

7

And I don't think any further discovery

THE JUDGE:

6

I know there had been

I'm looking at a, an order on

November 30th, 2004 ruling, so 18 months ago

Indicates,

A hearing was held on order to show

8

cause.

9

Plaintiff was represented by

10

Mr. Ady and defendants by Mr. Raty..., or

11

Raty ... having discussed the matter with

12

counsel... It says ... it's hereby

13

ordered the parties have 90 days from

14

entry of this order to conduct discovery

15

in regard to whether the parties have

16

settled the case.
Two, following the parties' 90 day

17
18

discovery period in regard to whether the

19

parties have settled the case the parties

20

shall time any and all dispositive

21

motions in regard to their settlement

22

agreement.

23

And that, this must have been my case back then and

24

it's been reassigned to me again.

25

2004.

That's under my signature

So that 90 day period has elapsed.

And did that

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 5

1

happen?

2

MR. ADY:

No.

3

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

And then there's an extension,

4

there's an agreement for an extension of time to April 30th

5

in the file, 2005.

6

you have time a, until April 30th to complete discovery.

7

That a, stipulated extension remains in place.

8

order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after

9

that.

10

So looks like you've agreed to, to that

And a, I'll

Sounds like you have some more time.
Then if I don't receive a certificate of readiness

1 1 for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the
12

case will be dismissed.

13

MR. ADY:

Very well, sir.

14

THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Mr. Ady.

15

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(August 10, 2006)

3

THE JUDGE:

4

Consulting, Inc. versus Porter.

5

your appearances please.

The court will call the matter of PDC
Counsel, will you state

6

MR. ADY:

Ronald Ady here for the plaintiff PDC.

7

MR. RATY:

Matthew Raty for the defendants,

8
9

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

We're here on the

10

defendant's motion to dismiss and objection to the

11

certificate of readiness for trial.

12

pleadings in support of the motion.

13

first, sir.

14

I've read the
I'll hear from you

ARGUMENT BY MR. RATY

15

MR. RATY:

16

As you noted we are here on the defendant's motion

17

for dismiss and a, objection to the certificate of readiness

18

for trial.

19

is that the motion is unopposed.

20

months ago and submitted to this court for decision more than

21

two months ago.

22

Thank you, Your Honor.

And the first thing I need to note for the court
The motion was filed three

Now, this morning when I got to my office I found a

23

fax from the plaintiff's attorney and that brief motion was

24

titled something like a motion to strike defendant's motion

25

to dismiss.

But a, that's definitely untimely by at least

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 3

1

two months and under the rules should not be considered by

2

the court.

3

In addition to those procedural rules why you

4

should dismiss the case, let me take you through some

5

important facts which also give you substantial reason under

6

the Jaw and under your discretion to dismiss the case.
The plaintiff's complaint, Your Honor, was filed on

7
8

April 6, 2001, more than five years ago.

9

actually settled within 10 days of the complaint being

10

filed.

And this case

Mr. Ady who sits here at plaintiff's counsel table

1 1 met with an attorney for the defendants and they sat down and
12

hammered out a settlement agreement and they both signed it.

13

And I've attached that to my pleadings which I've given to

14

you.

15

Subsequent to that...

And that was everyone's, of

16

course, understanding that the case that settled.

17

Subsequent to that as part of the settlement agreement a,

18

Mr. Ady deposed the defendant Jared Porter for approximately

19

14 hours, so he could have obtained more names or try to look

20

for some other entities to, to go after.

21

efforts by the plaintiff apparently proved fruitless.

22

the plaintiff at that point refused to a, enter a dismissal

23

of the case as was contemplated and agreed in the settlement

24

agreement.

25

These, these
So

So at that point, a, the plaintiff moved to set
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1

aside the settlement.

2

the complaint had been filed, two years after the case had

3

settled, and that was filed on May 9, 2003.

4

your predecessor, heard that motion to set aside the

5

settlement agreement filed by the a, the plaintiff.

6

think I've attached that a l s o —

7

THE JUDGE:

You have.

8

MR. RATY:

—

9
10

That motion was filed two years after

for your review.

Judge Davis,

And I

But one thing

said he said was, or his decision was a lengthy evidentiary
hearing is probably implicated, that experts would need to be

1 1 employed, and that each party may need to seek new legal
12

counsel.

13

defendant's previous attorney were both witnesses to the

14

settlement agreement and, and had filed affidavits disputing

15

a, whether the settlement had in effect been fulfilled.

16

a, that's what he said at that time.

17

Now, he said that because Mr. Ady and the

So

The plaintiff did nothing over the next year,

18

entire year subsequent to Judge Davis's ruling to challenge

19

the settlement.

20

scheduled an order to show cause.

21

Judge Davis as you probably noted, also a, put in his opinion

22

that the plaintiff had done nothing for two years on the case

23

and offered no explanation for his delay. ,

24
25

And so on November 30th, 2004 the court
Oh,

and by the way,

So then, you know, a year and a half or so passed
and we had this November 30, 2004 hearing with you, order to
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1

show cause over in Provo.

And a, at that point you noted

2

the hi_story and a, that the settlement dispute had never

3

been resolved.

4

discovery on the settlement issues and file any and all

5

dispositive motions in regard to the settlement agreement.

You gave the plaintiff 90 days to do

6

Now the plaintiff didn't do anything during that 90

7

day period, no discovery on the settlement issues, and didn't

8

file any motion.
At the end of that 90 day period I got a call from

9
10

Mr. Ady asking me to give him a 60 day extension for him to

1 1 do that discovery on the settlement issues and to file any
12

motion he may want to file on the settlement.

13

during that 60 day period the plaintiff did absolutely

14

nothing.

15

But again

And then after that, Your Honor, a whole other

16

year passed with the plaintiff doing nothing on the case.

17

And so you scheduled another order to show cause for

18

April 4th, 2006 of this year.

19

And a, I need to apologize to you because I went

20

down to the Provo court wrongly assuming you were still

21

down there for that hearing.

22

explain all of this to you at that time and explain that, you

23

know, there's been five years this case hasn't been

24

prosecuted by the plaintiff, and he never challenged the

25

settlement again, which it was his burden to do.

And a, you know, I was going to

And a,
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1

unfortunately I went to the wrong court.

I called your

2

clerk or one of your clerks, told them I would get over here

3

as quickly as I could and I did that.

4

door you had just concluded a, a hearing with Mr. Ady for the

5

plaintiff and you were walking into your chambers.

6

missed that hearing and I apologize for that.

As I walked in the

I did get a tape of the hearing to see what had

7
8

been said.

9

that hearing that you had with Mr. Ady was your

10

So a, I

And the most significant thing I thought in

misimpression of a stipulation between the parties.

And I

1 1 know I've given you a lot of dates and a lot of history so I
12

don't want to be confusing about this.
But taking you back to your first order to show

13
14

cause in November of 2004 you gave the plaintiff 90 days to

15

do that discovery on settlement and file dispositive

16

motion.

17

agreed to a 60 day extension for the plaintiff and that

18

extension was until April 30, 2005.

19

hearing with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your

20

understanding was that my stipulation ran through April 30,

21

2006.

At the end of that you'll remember I told you I

But with your, in your

22

THE JUDGE:

And I think you're right about that.

23

MR. RATY:

Okay.

24

THE JUDGE:

I think that that was a mistake.

25

MR. RATY:

Okay.

And I think this all could
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1

have been avoided.

And I apologize again if I just would

2

have come to the right court.

3

THE JUDGE:

That happens.

4

MR. RATY:

But then to my great surprise the, the

5

plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness for trial and, and

6

stated to the court that all the required pleadings had been

7

filed in this case, discovery had been completed, and that

8

there had been no settlement.

9

incorrect, Your Honor.

10

All those statements were

Because this case settled and that was never

1 1 overturned there's never been an answer filed, Judge Davis
12

made it clear that until we resolved this settlement issue a,

13

this, any litigation was not going to go forward on this

14

case.

15

challenge he could have done that and a, if he prevailed then

16

we could have got into litigation on the case.

17

never been an answer filed.

18

planning meeting, there's been no initial disclosures, the

19

plaintiff has not filed any initial disclosures, there's

20

never been a scheduling order that would allow me to a,

21

begin discovery on the case.

22

That was a hurdle or a bar that if he wanted to

But there's

There's been no attorney

And there, you know, I know this case settled and

23

you're not going to just dismiss it today because of the,

24

the failure to prosecute the case, and you ultimately wind up

25

saying there was no settlement, then I've got loads of
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1
2

litigation to do on this case
But a, I would ask you to dismiss it because

3

number one, the plaintiff had the burden of prosecution on

4

this matter.

5

the settlement which took place over five years ago, he's,

6

he's never done that.

7

since I gave him that last stipulation to extent the time to

8

challenge the settlement.

9

is reasons to dismiss the case.

10

He's had numerous opportunities to challenge

And a, more than one year has passed

And a, so that in and of itself

You're also well within the law and discretion to

11

dismiss it because my motion to dismiss was unopposed by,

12

by the plaintiff.

13

three months ago.

I mailed it to him, I faxed it to him, I

14

sent him a letter.

He had every opportunity to challenge

15

that motion to dismiss but he didn't do it.

16

second independent reason you're well within the law and

17

equity here to dismiss this case.

We're here today on that.

I filed it

So there's a

18

And, therefore, I would ask you to dismiss it.

19

Thank you, Your Honor.

20

THE JUDGE:

21

Mr. Ady?

22
23

Thank you very much, counsel.

ARGUMENT BY MR. ADY
MR. ADY:

Well, I suppose the first thing I would

24

like to address, Your Honor, is the last hearing.

I don't

25

think the court's comment about April 30th, 2006,

I haven't
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listened to the tape like Mr. Raty, but I don't believe that
that was a, I think that was a misstatement.

I don't think

it was something that, that the court, as I recall, it
understood was correct.

I think the court meant to say

April 30th, 2005 when it said that as I recall it.

Again I

haven't listened to the tape like Mr. Raty has but that's,
that was my impression.
Now, I understand Mr. Raty didn't appear at the
last hearing for a reason that has befallen all of us.

And

I've gone to the wrong court on the wrong date before, so I
certainly don't fault Mr. Raty for that.

I've shown up in

federal court and looked a little bit red faced because I was
there on the wrong day.
But the proper procedure would have been for him I
think to come back and a, renotice the hearing.
listened to the tape.

He

The court in its minute entry said,

was clear about what was to be done, file a certificate of
readiness or a scheduling order.

It was open to Mr. Raty to

do the very thing that he complains of here and that is file
a scheduling order.

He didn't do that.

that opportunity given by the court.
he's admitted.

He didn't take

He was aware of it as

And so I think a, instead he chose to dredge

up something that is already the law of this case and he's
asking the court to go back and overrule Judge Davis.

And

I've put in a very brief motion to strike his objection of
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1

certificate of readiness for trial.
Mascaro (phonetic) versus Davis, which is the case

2
3

pointing out that a coordinate judge simply doesn't have

4

jurisdiction to overrule a judge on the same matter in the

5

same case.

6

matter has already been decided.

The issue he brings before the court on this

In addition there is a statute that says, and I put

7
8

that in the memorandum as well, that bars second

9

applications.

He's had his kick at the can on this matter.

10

And so a, he's asking the court basically to go back and

11

overrule Judge Davis, which is improper.

12

The, the problem...

And he's, he's alleging that

13

this issue of settlement hasn't been litigated.

Well, if

14

one looks at the procedural history recited in Judge Davis's

15

order we've got April 9, 2003 defendant's motion to enforce,

16

memorandum in support of motion to enforce.

17

plaintiff's motion to set aside settlement, plaintiff's

18

memorandum in support.

19

memorandum in support of motion to enforce.

20

Jared Porter, affidavits by John Pate (phonetic),

21

supplemental affidavit by Jared Porter.

22

Motion to extent time.

23

lengthy if one looks at the file, dealing with all of these

24

affidavits, and a motion to strike.

25

hearing.

May 10th,

June 20th defendant' reply
Affidavit of

I
Notice to submit.

My motion to strike, which is quite

And then a court's
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And so a, if the court is going to actually look
at a, Mr. Raty's motion to dismiss I would submit that all
those materials are properly before the court.

And his

argument that I simply haven't responded to that is in
error.

They're there.

They're on the record.

And I

think it's clear that the affidavit evidence that they
present is not sufficient on the basis of the motions and the
memoranda I filed on September 25th.

I would invite the

court to consider those.
Secondly, Mr. Raty says that a, my motion to
strike is untimely and that the court can't consider it.
I beg to differ.

I think that it's clear a, cases like a,

Olsen versus Salt Lake County School District are, are very
clear that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time.
And this goes to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction.

I say that advisedly recognizing that I'm not

arguing that the court doesn't have subject matter
jurisdiction to deal with this case.

But there's a federal

court decision, and I wish I could recall it, if the court
wishes me to supplement I will.

It points out that what I'm

really arguing is not that the court lacks general subject
matter jurisdiction but there's a specific statutory bar and
a specific precedent by the supreme court of this state that
is a jurisdictional bar.

And that's what I'm really arguing
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1

here that the court is jurisdictionally barred and that that

2

can be raised at any time.

3

explicit.

4

And that a, the statute is quite

And as I say, for Mr. Raty to say well we haven't,

5

we've never really litigated this issue of this settlement

6

agreement I think is simply wrong.

7

the documents and the motions filed, and my memoranda that

8

was filed, and they are not unsubstantial.

9

vigorously and at length, Judge Davis decided it.

10

You go back and look at

We litigated this
We were

here on in April of this year, a certificate of readiness was

1 1 entered pursuant to that.

And as I say, Mr. Raty had the

1 2 opportunity to either file a scheduling order.

And at this

13

point we've got the deposition of Mr. Porter and we're saying

14

we're ready to go to trial on this case, we'll go, let's tee

15

it up and get it done with.

16

Mr|. Raty is arguing and saying well, 10 days after

17

a, this complaint was filed this case was settled, and

18

plaintiff has done nothing over these many years.

19

it's defendant here that has been trying to, that's been

20

arguing that this should have been enforced, this

21

agreement.

22

settlement

We said it should not have been.
And

defendant has had full opportunity throughout

23

all of this time to do all of the, the discovery.

24

done any of that.

25

Well,

It hasn't

And so I would submit to the court with due
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1

respect that if defendant points a finger at plaintiff in

2

saying you've delayed, there's three fingers on that hand

3

pointing right back at defendant because it's delayed as

4

well.

5

plaintiff and say well this delay by plaintiff, you should

6

dismiss it because of delay by plaintiff.

And there's simply no basis for it to, to attack

Well, the defendant has been guilty of gross delay

7
8

here, especially when since 2003 we've had Judge Davis's

9

decision, defendant knew that it was an issue, and now it's

10

jumping back and saying wait, I've got to do loads of

1 1 discovery.

And as I say, it had the benefit of this

1 2 court's direction at the last hearing in April, file a
13

certificate of readiness or file a scheduling order by

14

April 30th, do one of those two things.

15

here at the hearing but he came in just as it closed.

16

said he listened to the tape.

17

scheduling order, he didn't, he didn't present one to me or

18

the court.

19

Mr. Raty wasn't
And he

He didn't move to file a

We filed our certificate of readiness.
And we believe, and we've moved before the court

20

now we'd like to have a pretrial order, I've attached a

21

proposed form to our motion, and we would like to get this

22

matter set down for trial.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

Mr. Raty?

25

All right.

Thank you very much.

*
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1

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. RATY

2

MR. RATY:

3

I did, as Mr. Ady has repeatedly stated, listened

Thank you, Your Honor.

4

to the tape of your hearing with him.

5

did was told Mr. Ady who, of course, as the plaintiff has the

6

burden of prosecuting the case, you told him to file a

7

scheduling or, file a scheduling order or a certificate of

8

readiness for trial or you would dismiss the case.

9

again, that was under the misimpression you had that the

10

And a, and what you

And

stipulation was still in effect and had not ended a full year

1 1 previous.
12

I talked to Mr. Ady after your hearing with him

13

and asked him what he was going to do.

14

into chambers and he walked out of the court I said well,

15

what happened?

16

file a scheduling order or certificate of readiness for trial

17

or he's going to dismiss the case.

18

are you going to do?

19

that I understood him to mean that he was just going to drop

20

the case because he hadn't done anything on it for years, or

21

he would get a scheduling order and ask the court for more

22

time to address these settlement issues.

23

burden, not mine.

Because as you walked

I

24
25

And he, he said the judge told be I've got to

And I said, well what

And he said I don't know.

And by

That was his

I'm the defendant's attorney in this case.

And by

the way, he's a young man without financial resources, and
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1

he's already incurred tens of thousands of dollars in

2

litigation expenses in this case.

3

instructions to, to not incur more expense if at all

4

possible.

5

And, you know, I'm under

And, you know, it's Horn Book law that he's the

6

plaintiff, he has the burden of prosecution.

7

does nothing on the case the case should be dismissed.

And where he

It's not, he's trying to, you know, in fact he says, you
know, look at my fingers they're all pointing back at me.
10

It's not my burden, you know.

1 1 frivolous case all along.
1 2 ago.

We thought this was a

The case settled over five years

It's in my mind absurdly been a...

The plaintiff has

13

not complied with what it agreed to do in this the settlement

14

and dismiss the case when we complied, which we did, with the

15

settlement terms.
And so I'm in kind of a catch 22.

16

Do I try and

17

generate a lot more fees for my poor client to pay a, and

18

push this thing to a dismissal, which I did try to do, by the

19

way, before but Mr. Ady filed an affidavit swearing that a,

20

things had not been done which we said had been done in the,

21

in the settlement.

22

expensive for my client and he's without recourses

23

(phonetic).

24

does .

25

So it is a catch 22.

It's very

We don't have the burden of prosecution, he

And a, you know, by filing that, that came as a
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1

complete surprise.

2

litigation of the merits of his complaint, it's all been on

3

the issue of the settlement.

4

surprise to me that he would actually by bold enough to file

5

a certificate of readiness for trial when there's been no

6

discovery.

7

attorney planning meeting, no answer.

8
9

Because as you know there's been no a,

So it came as a complete

He's not even filed initial disclosures, no

So, you know, he's trying to blame me for this but
it's, it's his case that he filed originally.

The case was

10

settled, that's always been our position.

11

to get rid of that settlement it was his duty to do

12

something about it.

13

And if he wanted

Now he says well, I didn't have to respond to Mr.,

14

I didn't have to respond to the defendant's motion to

15

dismiss because a, all these issues were brought before the

16

court three years ago before Judge Davis.

17

not telling you there is he's done anything since Judge Davis

18

looked at all of those issues and made his ruling and said

19

there's disputes of fact here, you're going to have to do

20

discovery on these settlement disputes, you probably need to

21

hire new attorneys because Mr. Ady is a witness.

22

he's done absolutely nothing on these settlement issues

23

since Judge Davis made that ruling.

24

another chance and I gave him another chance he's done

25

nothing to challenge the settlement.

But a, what he's

And a,

And since you gave him
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1

So the things he was reading you from Judge Davis's

2

ruling, those were all things that, that came before his

3

November 2003 ruling, not things that have come after.

4

done nothing on the case.

5

He's

He did not respond to the motion to dismiss.

6

And by the way a, he, he's telling Your Honor that my motion

7

to dismiss is trying to rehash the settlement issues which

8

Judge Davis looked at.

9

dismiss was about.

That's not what my motion to

The basis of by motion was that the

10

plaintiff had not timely challenged a, the settlement

11

following Judge Davis's ruling back in November 2003, and

1 2 he's done absolutely nothing on the case otherwise whether,
13
14

with the settlement or otherwise.
That was the grounds for my motion to dismiss.

15

He didn't oppose it and Your Honor should, and I request,

16

I think we've suffered long enough with this, and I

17

that you dismiss the case with prejudice at this point.

18

Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

19

THE JUDGE:

I don't.

20

MR. ADY:

I appreciate it.

21

request

Thank you,

Your Honor.

22

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

23

MR. ADY:

I'd like to briefly reply, Your Honor.

24

THE JUDGE:

I don't think there's anything new

25

raised, counsel.

Is there something new that was raised in
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1

Scj> the things he was reading you from Judge Davis's

2

ruling, those were all things that, that came before his

3

November 2003 ruling, not things that have come after.

4

done nothing on the case.

5

He's

He did not respond to the motion to dismiss.

6

And by the way a, he, he's telling Your Honor that my motion

7

to dismiss is trying to rehash the settlement issues which

8

Judge Davis looked at.

9

dismiss was about.

That's not what my motion to

The basis of by motion was that the

10

plaintiff had not timely challenged a, the settlement

11

following Judge Davis's ruling back in November 2003, and

12

he's done absolutely nothing on the case otherwise whether,

13

with the settlement or otherwise.

14

That was the grounds for my motion to dismiss.

15

He didn't oppose it and Your Honor should, and I request,

16

I think we've suffered long enough with this, and I

17

that you dismiss the case with prejudice at this point.

18

Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

19

THF JUDGE:

I don't.

20

MR. ADY:

I appreciate it.

21

request

Thank you,

Your Honor.

22

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

23

MR. ADY:

I'd like to briefly reply, Your Honor.

24

THE JUDGE:

I don't think there's anything new

25

raised, counsel.

Is there something new that was raised in
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1

rebuttal?
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. ADY

2

MR. ADY:

3

He's saying that his motion goes beyond

4

Judge Davis's order.

And our point simply is that I don't

5

believe it does and that our September, and our

6

September 25th motion and memorandum is on the file, it's on

7

the record, it's there.

It's never been disposed of.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

10

MR. RATY:

I can hear you fine.

11

THE JUDGE:

Is that right?

8
9

12

Thank you.

Can you hear me

today?

losing my hearing.

Maybe it's me who is

It's possible.
COURT'S RULING

13
THE JUDGE:

14

This case comes before the court on

15

the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute

16

and also motion to strike or objection to the certificate

17

of readiness for trial filed by the plaintiff in this

18

matter.

19

Initially I want to deal with the question of this

20

court's order to show cause conducted on April 4th, 2006.

21

On that date the court held an order to show cause hearing to

22

determine why this case should not be dismissed for failure

23

to prosecute.

24

plaintiffs.

25

Mr. Ady appeared on behalf of the
Is it Raty?

MR. RATY:

Raty.
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1
2

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Raty did not appear that date.

He had mistakenly gone to the Provo courthouse.

3

The court called the matter.

Because we were at an

4

order to show cause status, a, counsel who has no objection

5

to the case being dismissed need not appear.

6

had appeared.

7

The plaintiff

And having reviewed the case file in preparation

8

for today's hearing I do concur with Mr. Raty that the court

9

was under the misimpression that the parties had stipulated

10

to a continuance of discovery to April 30th of 2006.

11

reviewed the file that is clearly a misimpression on my

1 2 part.
13

Having

And I'll go through those facts in a minute.
Unfortunately, that series of events reguired the

•14

defendant to file the present motion to address matters that

15

were unable, he was unable to present at the order to show

16

cause hearing.

17

No timely response was filed to that motion.

The

18

court has received a faxed a, motion to strike the

19

defendant's motion today.

20

unopposed motion to dismiss for hearing was because that it,

21

it is dispositive of the case, and also to give both parties

22

an opportunity to appear and to discuss the issues that

23

could have been presented at the order to show cause hearing

24

in April of 2006 but were not because of a, counsel's

25

traveling to the wrong courtroom by mistake.

The reason that I scheduled an
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1
2

As I said, I have had a chance to review the case
history.
The complaint was filed in April of 2001 and a

3
4

settlement, a written settlement agreement was reached

5

between the parties on April 15th, 2001.

6

settlement agreement I believe the parties, it's undisputed

7

that the defendant submitted to a lengthy deposition.
Approximately two years passed, well, more than

8
9

Pursuant to that

two years.

And in November of 2003 the plaintiff moved to

10

set aside the settlement agreement.

11

motion and ultimately issued a ruling dated November 3rd of

12

2003.

13

determination that,

14

Judge Davis heard that

Having considered that ruling it was Judge Davis's

A lengthy evidentiary hearing is

15

probably implicated, that experts would

16

need to be employed, and

17

that each party might need to seek new

18

legal counsel.

19

The court further found that,

20

Genuine issues of material fact

21

existed, and that neither party was

22

entitled to judgment as a matter of law

23

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of

24

Civil Procedure.

25

The court also noted,
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1

This case has been inactive for over

2

two years, even though plaintiff claims

3

that material breaches of the settlement

4

agreement by defendant occurred as early

5

as June and July of 2001.

6

offered no explanation for this delay.

7

The next hearing occurred almost, a little more

Plaintiff has

8

than one year later on November 30th, 2004.

The case had

9

been reassigned to this court at that time.

The court

10

issued and order to show cause why the case should not be

1 1 dismissed for failure to prosecute.

At that time the court

12

ordered that the parties file any and all dispositive

13

motions relating to the viability of the settlement

14

agreement within 90 days of November 30th, 2004.
Counsel by stipulation extended that 90 day period

15
16

for an additional 60 days and that period would have closed

17

on April 30th, 2005.

18

The next hearing was scheduled one year from the

19

expiration of that date on April 4th, of 2006 for order to

20

show cause.

21

the misimpression that the parties had stipulated to an

22

extension to April 30th of 2006, and based on that

23

misimpression I ordered that the plaintiff file a scheduling

24

order or file a certificate of readiness for trial by that

25

date.

And as I indicated, I believe that I was under
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The defendant moves to dismiss this action for

1
2

failure to prosecute based on that record.

3

that the plaintiff has had ample opportunity in which to

4

challenge the settlement agreement, that the court has

5

granted extensions to the plaintiff to allow that to happen,

6

that the defendant has granted extensions to allow that to

7

happen, and that no evidentiary hearing has ever been

8

scheduled and no discovery has ever been completed as to,

9

well, no evidentiary hearing has ever been held as directed

10

He contends

by Judge Davis as to whether the settlement agreement was

1 1 breached or not.
The plaintiff has appeared today and contends

12
13

that the, that the motion reguires a reassessment of Judge

14

Davis's November 2004 ruling, and that it would be

15

inappropriate for this court to in effect grant a viability

16

to the settlement agreement when Judge Davis has previously

17

ruled that a, genuine issues of fact would preclude such a

18

ruling.

19

In reply the defendant contends that it has never

20

been the defendant's burden of proof to challenge the

21

settlement agreement, that a written settlement agreement was

22

entered into by the parties, it's always been the defendant's

23

view that the settlement agreement was in place, and that it

24

would be the party seeking to set that settlement agreement

25

aside that would have the burden of proof and the burden of
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1

moving the case forward.
Having considered those arguments I find the, that

2
3

the defendant's arguments have merit.

4

is granted.

5

order consistent with that decision.

7

And I will look to you, Mr. Raty, to prepare an

MR[. RATY:

6

The motion to dismiss

Thank you Your Honor.

And that is

with prejudice, is it not?

8

THE JUDGE:

It is.

9

MR. ADY:

Your Honor—

THE JUDGE:

It's to dismiss for failure to

10
11

prosecute.
MR.1 ADY:

12

—

for the sake of clarifying the

13

record and in the interest of judicial economy, is the court

14

saying that the plaintiff is guilty of failure to prosecute

15

generally or is it the court's finding that the plaintiff has

16

failed to prosecute the issue of whether or not the

17

settlement agreement was enforceable?

1
THE JUDGE:

18
19

facts.

20

granted.

I've made a detailed record of the

And the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is

21

MR. RATY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

22

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

23

MR. ADY:

24
25

Court is in recess.

Could I put another thing on the record,

Your Honor, for the sake of the record?
THE JUDGE:

If you want to make a record.

I don't
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1

intend to readdress my factual statements.

2

MR. ADY:

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MR. ADY:

Very well.
So make your record, Mr. Ady.
For the record, Your Honor, with

5

respect, if the court is saying that the plaintiff hasn't

6

prosecuted the case generally, there's nothing in here in the

7

defendant's memorandum and motion which addresses those

8

issues and there's no case authority cited.

9

hasn't briefed the argument.

10
11

He simply

And so I would submit it's not

before the court.
As to the issue of whether or not plaintiff has

12

failed to prosecute the issue of the settlement agreement,

13

for the record we would also argue that the motion and

14

memorandum fails to put that properly into issue.

15

As I understood his motion it was a motion that

16

sought basically to say there's, there's an outstanding

17

settlement agreement, you've never moved to set that aside or

18

challenge that, the issue has been outstanding too long,

19

therefore, dismiss this case.

20

that I read.

21

That to me is the motion

And as I pointed out to the court previously, it's

22

our position the court has no jurisdiction and that a, once

23

again the defendant has simply failed to brief that issue,

24

cites no case authority in support of that issue if that in

25

fact is the issue that he was arguing.

And we would submit
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that there's simply nothing before the court to rule on or at
the least there's no adequate argument before the court if
that is the issue.
Thank you.
THE JUDGE:
supplemented record.

All right.

Thank you for that

Court's in recess.

Thank you.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
2
STATE OF UTAH
)

3

SS,

COUNTY OF UTAH
4
5
6

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify

8

that I received the electronically recorded copy CD #0651PCR1

9

in the matter of PDC vs. Porter, hearing date August 10,

10

2006, and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a

11

full, true and correct transcription of said hearing so

12

recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages

13

numbered 1 through 26, inclusive except where it is indicated

14

that the tape recording was inaudible.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 16th day of May,

15
16

2007.

17
18
19

r, COURT REPORTI
PEITNY C. ABfcOTTT
REPORTER/NOTARY
License 22yi02811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-08

20
21
22
PENNY C ABBOTT
23

norm PUBLIC • STATE O/ UTAH

24

COMM. EXP. 09/24/2008

1817E8O0S
SALEM UT 84653

25
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FILED

SEP
Matthew H. Raty (#6635)
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Fax:(801)495-2262
Attorney for Plaintiff

6 2006

4TH D I S T R I C T ^
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

PDC CONSULTING, INC.,
Plaintiff,

]
1
]>

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

V.

JARED PORTER, and JARED PORTER,
dba CELL INTERACTIVE, and JARED
PORTER dba CELLDESIGN; and DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.

]1
]1
)
)

Case No. 050100017
Judge Derek P. Pullan

]

On August 10, 2006, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Objection to Certificate of Readiness for Trial came before the court for hearing. Plaintiff was
represented by its counsel, Ronald Ady, and Defendants were represented by their attorney, Matthew H
Raty. Having reviewed the memoranda filed in support and in opposition to Defendants' motion, having
heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10, 2006 hearing, including, but not limited
to, the following:

(J i .

1.

Plaintiff failed to prosecute the case.

2.

Plaintiff failed to timely renew its denied motion to set aside the parties' April 15.

2001 settlement agreement within the dates and extensions given by court and opposing counsel to
renew the motion.
3.

Plaintiff failed to timely oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss.

DATED this _6>_ day of Jl^?/.

2006.
BY THE COUI

tfWK£0

0 I Closed2006\Porter\P\0-DismissComplaint
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